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John THE SINO-SOVIET 
Sendy CONFLICT
T he  origins and m eaning of the current disputes between  
China and the Soviet Union are discussed by a Vice-Presi- 
dent of the C om m unist Party.
SUN YAT-SEN, in  a statem ent published in  Izvestia two days after 
his death in  M arch 1925, expressed the hope tha t the day would 
soon come when the USSR w ould welcome a friend an d  ally in a 
m ighty, free C hina, and  tha t in  the great struggle for the liberation 
of the oppressed people of the w orld bo th  these allies w ould go 
forw ard to victory h and  in  han d .1
T his dream  of Sun Yat-sen’s appeared to  be consum m ated 24 
years la ter w ith  the tru ly  w orld-shattering victory of the Chinese 
revolution in  1949. I t  wTas propagated  by loud, and  convincing, 
announcem ents of the “unbreakable solidarity” betw een the USSR 
and C hina and  epitom ised in the top of the h it parade song 
“Moscow-Peking” played and  sung ad nauseam  th ro u g h o u t China 
in  the early 50’s. N ik ita  K rushchov at a b an q u e t in  Peking on 
Septem ber 30, 1959 concluded his speech thus:
Comrades, ou r peoples have emerged on a wide and clear road  and are full 
of boundless energy. T h ere  are no tasks that cannot be accomplished by a 
thousand m illion people who have shaken off the  bonds of capitalist slavery. 
We are advancing to o u r cherished goal full of boundless confidence in  the 
correctness of our just cause, and rallied closely together. T h is un ity , lit by the 
inextinguishable ligh t of M arxism -Leninism, is our great achievem ent which we 
shall preserve as the apple of our eye.2
A far cry indeed to  today:
W ith burn ing  h a tred  for the  enemy, hundreds of m illions of arm ym en and 
civilians in  different parts of C hina have been holding rallies and dem onstrations 
during  the past few days . . . T hey  indignantly  denounced the  K rem lin’s new 
tsars for their heinous crimes . . . T h e  Chinese people, arm ed w ith Mao Tse- 
tung T h ough t and tem pered in the G reat P role tarian  C u ltu ra l R evolution arc 
determ ined and have the strength  to  defend the sacred territo ry  of the great 
m otherland and hand  the aggressors the blows they deserve.3
1 See E. H. Carr, Socialism in One Country, Vol. 3, Part II, M cM illan, p. 717.
2 C ited in Jo h n  Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet D ispute, O xford University 
Press, 1968, p. 333.
3 Peking Review  No. 34, August 22, 1969, pp. 8-9.
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On M arch 11 this year the Chinese People's Daily declared that 
“the Soviet revisionist renegade clique thus owes a debt in blood 
lo the Chinese people” . In May the Soviet jou rn a l Ogonyok  refer- 
red to the Soviet “determ ination  to defend every little  shred of 
o u r native la n d ” and  to the Soviet peoples righ t to  “holy vengeance 
for every d ro p  of blood shed by the sons of the M otherland '.
Such are bu t a tiny sample of the incredible statem ents em anat­
ing from  bo th  sides in w hat has developed over the years from a 
b itte r verbal wrangle to arm ed border clashes. T h e  world watches 
agog as war p reparations are m ade and  pre-em ptive strikes are 
discussed. T h e  w orld also puzzles as to how  it all came about and 
as to what  it is all about. It is simplistic nonsense to assert (as 
some do) th a t one side is righ t and  the o ther wrong, i t  is almost 
irrelevant to  speculate as to who “started  i t”. It is fantastic to 
im agine the consequences for the w orld of such a war which would 
be unw innable  and  “endless". It boggles the im agination to con­
sider these events from  the standpo in t of socialist principles for 
there seems little  of socialist principle involved.
The  Background
T h e  answers lie, undoubtedly, in the history ol C hina and Russia, 
in the particu la r histories of the two revolutionary  movements, their 
C om m unist Parties and  their place in  the world com m unist move­
m ent and  in  the relative dom inance of the CPSU in w orld com­
m unist affairs over a long period. T h e  idea that the conflict com­
m enced in  the period of 1958 has to be abandoned in the light of 
the facts.
E xam ination  of the history of the Chinese revolution  reveals 
tha t it largely was fought and won against the advice and  instruction 
of foreign com m unists (Com intern and  Stalin). It suffered reverses 
and  frequently  catastrophic defeats when it followed such foreign 
advice, an d  won victories w hen it w orked ou t its own strategy and 
tactics. Soviet advice th roughou t the history of the relations 
seems actuated  as m uch by desires to pro tect its far eastern borders 
and  d ip lom atic  necessities as by desire to fu rther the Chinese 
revolution  — perhaps understandable  b u t hardly a p ro letarian  
in te rna tiona list approach. For those w ho argue tha t such Soviet 
interests should  have been the prim ary  consideration and  that 
the Soviet a ttitu d e  was thus justified, the proof of the pudding  
lay in  the eating  as almost invariably  w hen the Chinese under 
Mao T se-tung w ent against Soviet advice they won victory, weakened 
im perialism  and  seemed to strengthen the com m unist movement.
Soviet (and C om intern) policy in  the 1920’s saw Chinese revo­
lu tion  as essentially national in  character and led by the nationalist 
Kuo M in-tang. T h e  young C om m unist Party  was to work w ith in
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the K M T as individuals to exert p ro le tarian  influence. Indeed 
such a polit \ seemed ideal, lor Sun Yat-sen had w arm  relations 
w ith the Soviet U nion, likewise his successor G hiang Kai-shek. 
Soviet advisers (e.g. Borodin) had considerable influence on the 
K M T. G hiang was appo in ted  an honorary m em ber of the presidium  
at the tith Gongress of the Com m unist In te rn a tio n a l in  192(3. In 
the same year he wrote:
Only after the overthrow  ol imperialism  tan  China obtain  freedom . . .  In the 
present world revolution, there  is the Third In ternational, which can be called 
the general stall of the revolution . . .  If we want our revolution to succeed, 
we must unite  with Russia to overthrow  imperialism  . . .  If Russia aids the 
Chinese revolution, does th a t mean she wants to oblige C hina to apply Com ­
munism!’ No. she wants us to carry out the national revolution. If the Com ­
m unists join the Ktio M in-tang, does this mean that they w ant to apply Com ­
munism!’ No. they do not w ant to do th a t either . . .•
Strong words and also revealing words. W ho could blam e the 
Russians for placing some considerable reliance on Ghiang? Yet 
this was penned at a lim e when G hiang had  already commenced 
arresting com m unists and  rem oving them  from  leading positions 
in the K M T  organisation.
China was not a un ified  country. In the early 20's there were 
llnee m ain influences, the K M T  in the South, and the w arlords W u 
Pei-fu in  Peking and  C hang Tso-lin in M anchuria. T h e  Soviet 
U nion established w arm  relations w ith the K M T  in the south yet 
pursued d ip lom atic interests w ith  Peking and  M anchuria. One ol 
Sun Yat-sen’s and  G hiang Kai-shek’s dearest wishes was for the 
revolution  to be ex tended  from  the south by the undertak ing  of 
the N orthern  E xpedition  aim ing to defeat the feudal m ilitarists to 
the north . Yet this was no t originally supported  by the Soviet 
U nion  who strove to re ta in  good relations w ith all the m ain 
Chinese influences on its eastern borders. T h e  Chinese com m unists 
had  to be pressurised periodically to m ain ta in  co llaboration  w ith 
the K M T  ancl this rem ained  Soviet policy for a tim e even after 
G hiang Kai-shek had  massacred the workers' m ovem ent in  Shanghai 
in  A pril 1927.
M ilitary and peasant uprisings followed in the wake of the 
failure of the policy of collaboration w ith the K M T . T h e  CPC 
general-secretary Chen T u-hsin  was sacked and denounced as a 
righ t opportun ist (he had largely carried ou t Moscow s instructions) 
ancl Chu C hiu-pai became party  leader so com m encing the first 
left line in  the Chinese Party, in  D ecem ber 1927 the C anton u p ­
rising was bru ta lly  suppressed after being influenced  by Stalin 
against the better judgem ent of m en on the spot. Li Li-san became 
the guiding sp irit in  the Party and  fu rth er uprisings ancl frontal 
attacks on big cities ended in  disaster.
* Cited in Stuart Schram, M ao Tse-tung, Penguin p. 92.
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In 1930 the M oscow-trained .student C hen  Shao-v u (W ang Ming) 
re tu rned  to C hina and along with dose colleagues was installed in 
in fluen tia l positions in the Chinese Party. W ang M ing had spent 
five years in the Soviet U nion, where he had gone at the age of eight­
een, studying the revolutionary m ovem ent. He joined the Chinese 
C om m unist Party in Moscow two years later, and was 23 years ol 
age on re tu rn  to C hina. T h u s began the second, equally disastrous, 
left line of adventurism  and  rigidity, ol ill-conceived uprisings, 
m ilitary  confrontations with the superior forces, the slogan “attack 
on all fron ts" whic h led to the vic tory of C hiang Kai-shek's campaign 
of encirclem ent and annih ila tion  in respec t to the m ain base areas 
of the revolution.-'
Following these defeats came the vic tory of Mao Tse-tung in the 
councils of the Chinese Party. T h is  occurred in 193") at the famous 
T suny i m eeting in  Keichow Province a t the com m encem ent of the 
Long M arch. From  tha t time the Chinese Party shook off the 
Soviet influence, it developed u n inh ib ited  its own peculiarly Chinese 
strategies and  tactics and despite incredible hardship  and obstacles 
proceeded from  victory to victory cu lm inating  in the defeat of 
C hiang Kai-shek in 1919.
R elations between the Chinese and Soviet com m unists in the 
years 1935-1949 appear to have been sparse, desultory and remote.
T h e  problem s of relations with the  Soviet U nion . . . involved alongside rivalrv 
a genuine feeling of solidarity between the Com m unists of the  two countries. 
At the same tim e Stalin had two distinct bu t related goals, both of which were 
totally unacceptable to Mao Tse-tung. T h e  first was to avoid pushing the revolu­
tion  in C hina too hard  if this was likely to endanger Moscow's diplom atic position. 
T h e  second was to make sure th a t the  Com m unist movement in C hina rem ained 
under Soviet guidance and control. Although the form in which these issues 
presented themselves varied substantially over the  years, the two basic tensions 
persisted du rin g  the entire  period from 1935 to 1
Stalin was no t keen about M ao's prosecution of the civil war 
against C hiang Kai-shek following the defeat of Japan . It is 
undoub ted ly  this a ttitu d e  to w hich the Chinese refer when referring 
to S talin ’s mistakes in  the m iddle 40's. Yugoslav sources m ain tain  
tha t Stalin told Kardelj how he had advised the Chinese communists
5 Incidentally  W'ang M ing has recently em erged from obscurity by writing a 
pam phlet “C hina, C u ltu ra l R evolution or C ounter Revolutionary Coup?", a 
particu larly  vitriolic and subjective attack on Mao Tse-tung which has been 
circulated widely th roughout the world by the  Novosti Press Agency. W ang 
M ing sums u p  his “analysis” by stating  th a t Mao "has become not only an 
enem y of the  Com m unist Party of C hina b u t also the common enemy of the 
in te rnational com m unist movem ent. He has become not only the enemy of 
th e  Chinese people, b u t the common enemy of the en tire  progressive and peace- 
loving h u m an ity”. Presum ably "any th ing  goes" in the struggle against such a 
man!
•  Schram, Mao Tse-tung, pp. 192-193.
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to join the C hiang governm ent and  dissolve the ir army. (See Schram 
p. 238). Such a ttitudes on S talin ’s part, it is alleged, reflected 
concern to placate, and  not upset, the U nited  States and  so avoid 
jeopardising Soviet security in the Far East so soon after the war.
The Nino-Soviet Treaty ol Friendship, Alliance an d  M utual 
Assistance was signed in February 1950 after prolonged negotiations 
conducted b \ M ao Tse-tung in Moscow. M ao’s three m onths 
absence from China leaves the impression of some hard  bargaining. 
Certainly Soviet credits to C hina of 60 m illion  U.S. dollars annually  
for five years to be repaid  by 1963 could not be considered immense 
aid. Soviet presence in  D arien and  Port A rth u r was to continue 
until 1952 —  yet in fact lasted un til after S ta lin ’s death  —  possibly 
due to the physical proxim ity  of the Korean war. I t was no t u n til 
a fter Stalin died th a t assistance and  relations blossomed.
I lie starting-point in the disintegration of these new tlose ties between Moscow 
and Peking was unquestionably krushchov's secret speech at the T w en tie th  Party 
Congress denouncing Stalin's crimes. T his does no t m ean th a t the Chinese 
objected as violently to  Krushchov's action as they have recently claimed. On 
the contrary, the Chinese press a t the tim e indicated strong approval of certain 
aspects of "d estab iliza tio n '. Nevertheless, the T w entieth  Party Congress m arked 
the  beginning of an evolution in Soviet policy, the  u ltim ate  consequences of 
which were to prove unacceptable to Mao, even if he d id  no t clearly foresee 
them  at the tim eJ
In 1953 following S ta lin ’s death  some rank  and  file Chinese 
communists asked the question: “Now tha t S talin  is dead  w ill M ao 
Tse-tung have to go and  work in  Moscow.-*” T h is  was laughingly 
and patiently  rejected by ideological cadres. Yet after witnessing 
the policies of the 20th Congress and noting  w hat they considered 
to be the “adven tu rist” and  “revisionist” proclivities of Krushchov 
and  the Soviet leadership, it is not inconceivable and  indeed is 
almost certain  th a t M ao Tse-tung decided th a t the new revolu­
tionary H Q  should be transferred  from Moscow to Peking and  
th a t the m antle of S talin  should fall upon himself. H ence began 
the battle for hegem ony in the C om m unist and  revolutionary  
movem ent (and indeed for w orld hegemony) w'hich has developed 
to the stage it has reached today.
M ore Recent Controversies
N aturally  national in terest and  hegem onistic aims have rem ained 
obscured on both  sides. For over ten years the row has developed 
fiercely on a wide range of issues involving alm ost every sphere of 
policy and interest: the assessment of Stalin; a form idable range ol 
ideological questions involving peaceful co-existence an d  the pos­
sibility of peaceful transition  to socialism in  some countries; 
a ttitudes to the U nited  States; questions relating  to C h in a ’s in ternal
” Schram, p.285.
43
AU STRALIAN LEFT REVIEW Oitober-N ovem ber 1969
policies such as the com m unes and  the G reat Leap Forward; the 
w ithdraw al of Soviet experts from  C hina; the S ino-lndian border 
clash; nuclear weapons; T aiw an; Czechoslovakia; the V ietnam  war 
an d  m any o ther im portan t m atters. T h e  general course of the 
d ispute and  the argum ents is well know n and it is not the purpose 
here to  exam ine them  in detail. Yet some com m ents on a few art- 
necessary.
It is in teresting  tha t assessments of Stalin are closer today than 
at any tim e since 1956. T here  is little  doub t th a t official Soviet 
views today approxim ate the Chinese w hile they are less fo rth ­
righ tly  expressed. T h e  rehab ilita tion  of Stalin proceeds in the 
Soviet U nion, hesitantly  and in  m uted  tones.
T h e  w ithdraw al of the Soviet experts w ith the ir b lueprin ts 
provides one of the Soviet moves w hich greatly exacerbated the 
conflict an d  makes reconciliation a most long range affair. T he 
w riter, in  Moscow in 1964, was shown volum inous docum ents which 
proved only the weakness of the Soviet case and po in ted  up  the 
whole exercise as being designed to teach the Chinese a lesson.
Possibly the d ispute over nuclear weapons provides a m ore basic 
revelation of the real issues in  the Sino-Soviet conflict. T h is d ispute 
d id  not receive any public  a iring  u n til some four tears after its 
occurrence.
As far back as Ju n e  20, 1959, when there  was not yet the  slightest sign of a 
treaty  on stopping nuclear tests, the Soviet G overnm ent unila terally  tore up  the 
agreem ent on new technology for national defence, concluded between China 
and the Soviet U nion on Octobcr 15, 1957, and  refused to provide C hina w ith a 
sam ple of an  atom ic bom b and technical data  concerning its m anufacture. T his 
was done as a presentation  gift at the tim e the  Soviet leader went to the  United 
States for talks witli Eisenhower in Septem ber . .
T h is  accusation has not been refu ted  by the Soviet U nion  and 
the way in  which the Soviet G overnm ent replied to it clearly 
indicates the correctness of the m ain  charges while the reasons 
for the change of policy are, perhaps, ano ther question. In  Sep­
tem ber 1963 a Soviet statem ent stressed th a t the Chinese economic 
situation  w ould  have to be strained to the utm ost to produce even 
“a few atom  bom bs”. It com plained th a t the Chinese had  made 
public “classified docum ents and in fo rm ation  re la ting  to the cle- 
iences of the countries of the socialist com m unity” and  had 
presented the facts in "a d istorted lig h t”. T h e  statem ent w ent on 
to stress the necessity of p reventing the spread of nuclear weapons 
in the interests of peace and  in  the interests of C hina and  argued 
th a t it w ould  be w rong to fight against the arm ing of W est G erm any 
w ith nuclear weapons and against th e ir spreading in  the “W est”
8 Peking R eview , August 16, 1963.
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generally while a t the same tim e supplying C hina w ith  them. It 
claim ed that C hina w ould be better off devoting its efforts to 
developing the national economy and  the well-being of the Chinese 
people than exhausting  itself to produce the bom b. A fu rth er 
Soviet S tatem ent em phasised tha t C hina had no need of the bom b 
because the Soviet U nion  had nuclear power enough “ to wipe from  
the face of the earth  any state . . . that m ight encroach on the 
revolutionary gains of the socialist countries.”9
However sym pathetic one m ight be towards the Soviet argum ent, 
and  there is logic in  it, one m ust easily recognise the paternalistic, 
in terfering  natu re  of the reply on which aspects the Chinese were 
quick to seize. A nationalistic  governm ent w ith  hegem onistic am ­
bitions would hardly take kindly to being told “W e’ll look after 
you” ! Viewed in  such a context the Soviet argum ent in  reality 
seeks to place all socialist countries under Soviet patronage ancl 
influence —  in one sense a realistic approach in the politico- 
m ilitary sphere yet hardly  conducive of relations of equality  or 
equal rights, m ore particu larly  when the history of the Soviet 
U nion itself has been tarn ished ra th e r badly by national in terest 
and  hegemony.
T h e  problem  of T a iw an  has assumed greater im portance as the 
d ispute has unfolded.
T h e  Chinese have in  fact claim ed (in their G overnm ent Statem ent of Septem ber 1, 
1903) that Krushchov came to  Peking after his C am p Davicl talks w ith Eisen­
hower in 1959 in a b id  to persuade them  (the Chinese) to accept a  "T w o Chinas" 
s ituation  oil the  ground th a t “T aiw an was an incendiary factor in the in te r­
national situation". If Krushchov did make such an a ttem pt, then  it seems 
likely lie was inspired to do so by his talks w ith Eisenhower. T h e  Chinese could 
be excused for assuming th a t T aiw an was a bargaining counter in  the  Soviet/C S. 
detente. T h e  Soviets, in th e ir statem ent of Septem ber 21, 1963, claim ed K rush­
chov simply spoke of “ peaceful ways” to solve the  T aiw an issue. T hey  added, 
however, that: “ No do u b t rem ains now that one of the  reasons for the attack 
In the Chinese leaders on the  policy of the world com m unist m ovem ent was the 
lessening of in te rnational tension which took place in 1959 when there  was a 
definite relaxation in  the cold war between the Soviet U nion and the U nited 
States, especially after C om rade Krushchov's visit to the  L .S.A..1®
Indeed if such was not Soviet policy in 1959 it seems likely tha t 
it is now. T h ere  is increasing evidence of Soviet negotiations w ith 
T a iw an  in the context of the grow ing Sino-Soviet conflict. A clear 
statem ent of Soviet a ttitudes to ancl relations w ith  T aiw an  is 
called for.
Why?
How can it come abou t th a t the two m ain  socialist countries 
appear to be on the verge of war? T h e  accusations h u rled  by each
John  Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, pp . 102-109.
lo Gregory Clark, In  Fear o f China, Lansdowne Press, 1967, p. 116.
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one at the* o ther have great sim ilarity — new tsars, Maoist clique, 
re tu rn  to capitalism , m ilitary-bureaucratic d ictatorship, collusion 
with U.S. im perialism , aggressor, social im perialist, etc., etc. - 
heaps of wildness, exaggeration, spite and self-righteousness with 
elem ents of tru th , yet w ith little  of real m arxist analysis apparen t. 
In fact the whole sorry picture makes a mockery of socialist p rin ­
ciples as they are practised in the two countries and seriously calls 
in to  question the protagonists degree of adherence to revolutionary 
socialism. It highlights the immense pressure of nationalism  and 
self-interest w hich determ ines, in particu lar, external policy.
The tru e  cause of the Sino.Soviet conflict lias become increasingly clear; it is the 
struggle for leadership — for leadership in the  "socialist cam p", in the Com 
m iniist world m ovement, and in the world as a w ho le ."
M ehnert's observation, m ade five years ago, is undoubted ly  the 
crux of the m atter. T h e  Soviet U nion fears China as a rival. 
Since the thirties Chinese Com m unists have never been p lian t in 
the ir relations w ith the Soviet U nion and  have become increasingly 
less'so. T hey  owed little  to the Soviet U nion in  the first place, 
in  any direct sense, in  the w inning of the ir revolution except for 
the very presence of th a t country in the world scene. T hey  grew up 
to  very defin ite  independence in a ttitude , a feature never favoured 
by Soviet leaderships since Lenin. For in  this connection there 
is no C om m unist Party  leadership anyw here pursu ing  independent 
policies who are viewed kindly by the Soviet leadership.
W ith  the advent of China 011 the world scene after 1949 and 
th e ir claim  of C hina representing the m odel of socialist revolution 
for a vast p a rt of the world the hegemony of the Soviet U nion 
came u n d er direct challenge.
If C hina had  provided the m odel 011 which fu tu re  revolutions am ong the peoples 
of Asia (and perhaps later of Africa) should be based, this was also a claim that 
C hina should lead and guide these revolutions towards their goal: the claim 
th a t Mao had  added new tru th s to Marxism, m eaning the experience and practice 
of the Chinese revolution, was also a claim th a t C hina could provide th a t in te r­
preta tion  of the orthodox doctrines of Com m unism  most applicable in her 
legion. These argum ents am ounted to a restatem ent in  m odern terms of two 
of the fundam ental postulates of the old Chinese view of the  world: th a t China 
was the  centre of civilisation, the m odel w hich less advanced states and peoples 
should copy if they were to  be accepted w ith in  the pale, and th a t the ru ler of 
C hina was the expounder of orthodox doctrine; that, after all and always, Chinese 
in terpreta tions were the righ t ones; tru th  and rig h t th ink ing  m ust come from 
C hina and conform  with Chinese teaching.1-
FitzG erald’s in teresting and pene tra ting  assessment is given m uch 
more w eight w ith the m ore recent Chinese claims th a t M ao Tse- 
tu n g ’s T h o u g h t is M arxism -Leninism  in  the contem porary world
"  Klaus M chncrt, Peking and Moscow, M entor, 1064, pp. 485-486.
12 C. P. FitzG erald, The Chinese View of T h e ir  Place in I he W orld, Oxford 
University Press, 1964, pp . 48-49.
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ancl that the Chinese m odel and  m ethods are applicable in all 
countries. Small w onder tha t the Soviet leadership, whose socialist 
outlook is contam inated  w ith a national in terest reflected in  a 
hegemonistic position and  aims, should be concerned. T h u s  the 
collision course developed.
T h e  popu lar feeling in C hina against the Soviet U nion is well 
known, w hipped up  by the leadership’s frenzied cam paign against 
the Soviet “revisionists” and “social im perialists”. It is a na tio n a l­
istic fervour seldom witnessed h itherto . For C h ina the Soviet U nion 
has become the N um ber One enemy and danger. W hat of the 
position in  the Soviet U nion?
After visiting the Soviet U nion in 1967 A lexander W erth  wrote:
In  theory, the  U nited  States is Russia's Enemy N um ber One. But only in 
theory. T h e  nuclear “ balance of terro r", if noth ing else, makes a Soviet-American 
war very unlikely; m oreover there  has never been a war betw een Russia and 
America, and there is no area in the world today where Am erican and Russian 
interests clash in any violent way. If the Americans felt th a t it was their duty 
to the "Free W orld" to “destroy com m unism ”, they would — and should — 
have started long ago on destroying Russia (rather th an  little  Vietnam) ; but 
as lie  Gaulle said, there were at least a dozen different “comm unism s", and 
the  Russian variety has become one of the most innocuous, w ith the concept 
of the  "na tion  state" strongly predom inating  over th a t of “revolutionary m is­
sion" in the world.
No, the U nited States is not Enemy N um ber One. Enemy N um ber One — at 
least in Russian popu lar im agination  is C hina . . .is
W erth  goes on to re la te  his observation of p o p u la r R ussian fears
. . . the real q uarre l w ith C hina is not over ideology that it is in reality a 
quarre l between two nation-states; th a t the Chinese, already 700 or 800 m illion 
strong, will soon have a billion  people, and that their population  cauldron may 
well explode some day, and th a t there is som ething particu larly  sinister in the  
frequent incidents on the  Chinese-Soviet border, and in  the territo ria l claims 
m ade on various Russian territories in C entral Asia and the Far East, allegedly 
stolen from C hina by the Russian Tsars, (p. 269).
T h a t such w idespread fears exist has been noted by A ustralian  
Com m unists visiting the Soviet U nion. (Such fears have a d isturb ing  
sim ilarity to the “yellow hordes to the n o rth ” idea w hich has been 
skilfully used by the A ustralian  ru ling  class over long years in 
order to foist a policy on the A ustralian n a tion  of “i t ’s better to 
fight them  over there before they come h ere”.) T h is  is fu rther 
illustrated, for exam ple, by an article p rin ted  in  Pravda  on August 
16, following the clash on the Sinkiang frontier. T h e  writers, 
discussing the rocky ou tcrop  of the Ju n g arian  Gates, state that 
through these very gates three  centuries ago came foreign invaders in  an 
avalanche onto the Kazakn steppe. T h e  peoples’ m em ory has re ta ined  the pain  
and wrath, the h a tred  and courage of those far-off years. T h e  present rulers of 
C hina are sending their soldiers along the same p a th  as the bloody campaigns 
of the J un g irian  conquerors.
13 A lexander W erth , Russia — H opes and Fears, Penguin, 1969, p. 266.
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W hat possibilities are presented lo r the im perialists to choose 
priorities in  dealing w ith its two m ajor enemies is easily im agined. 
T h is conflict plays right in to  the hands of such governm ents as 
those of the U.S. and  Australia. A conflict of such m agnitude, 
com plexity and fierceness between the Soviet U nion and China 
relieves m uch of the pressure upon im perialism  and weakens the 
revolutionary  struggle around  the world. T h e  Soviet handling  of 
the com plex situation with China tends to back up the im perialist 
argum ents of C hina's aggressiveness and c asts doub t on the collective 
security proposals for South East Asia.
Is C hina aggressive? T h a t dubious and  even ridiculous territo ria l 
claims have been advanced in  various ways is obvious. T h a t border 
clashes have been provoked by C hina is probable. T h a t bellicose- 
sounding statem ents have em anated from  C hina is all too true. 
Yet has m odern  C hina a record of aggression? T h is  cannot, in  
fairness, be said. In 1965 Sir R obert Scott the form er British 
Com m issioner G eneral in  SE Asia and  form er perm anent secretary 
to the B ritish  Defence M inistry, in  delivering the Dyason M em orial 
lecture in  Sydney, po in ted  ou t th a t historically the Chinese had 
never been given to striking the first blow  and tha t the Chinese 
under com m unism  would respond only when they felt their 
security threatened. N um erous com m entators and  students of 
C hina strongly share this view as does this w riter. However the 
Chinese C om m unists do take the view of keeping the pressure 
on the ir enemies, of “ tw isting the tiger's ta il"; a tactic used against 
C hiang  forces and  the U nited  States and obviously now against 
the Soviet U nion. Such “pressure", presum ably, will be kept up 
at points of d isputed  territory. Yet this is qu ite  a different thing 
to invasion or even pre-em ptive strikes. T h e  Chinese com m unists’ 
m ilitary  record definitely has not been one of adventurism  and 
ill-conceived blows against superior enemies.
Socialists cannot support m ilitary measures by either side to 
decide this issue. W hat has to be in troduced  in to  this debacle is 
patience, negotiations and socialist principles. A ustralians, of 
course, w ill be able to influence the course of events hardly  at all. 
So tha t for A ustralian  socialists the em phasis inevitably becomes 
the struggle to re-introduce real socialist and  m arxist approaches 
and  analysis w ithou t fear or favour, scattering the m yths and 
illusions b u ilt up  over years and looking the problem s squarely 
in the face.
Shortly before his death  Lenin strongly w arned of the dangers 
of great na tion  chauvinism  and its effects upon  the peoples and 
revolutions of the East and these are the problem s w hich have 
em erged so clearly today. T h a t they could emerge so strongly 
necessitates exam ination  of the state of socialism in the world.
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